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It is often assumed that Bergson’s intuition is a dead end: much goes into it, but nothing 
comes out of it. In this article I attempt to show that this is not so. Intuition is understood 
by him as containing noetic content (ideas, notions) which can be developed in the sciences 
and elsewhere. In this article there is an effort to show how his notions of variable lived space 
and the dynamic character of physical matter could lead, for example, to theories of fractal 
dimension and theories of the creation and expansion of matter. Bergsonian intuition can 
never be the simple acceptance of our ordinary ideas as we customarily think them. It involves 
two gestalt shifts: one that takes us from our ordinary  spatial concepts  to a fundamental 
dynamic insight, a second shift which takes us from the insight to a new approach to the 
world. One is made to leave the cave and then, newly enlightened, to return to it. 
***
This essay purports to establish three things. First, that Bergson’s 
fundamental discovery, duration, is far from being a vague and formless 
flux. It has structure whose parts and relations can be distinguished and 
understood. That structure is qualitative and dynamic, like heard music. 
But it is structure nonetheless. Second, that duration can be shown to have 
‘dimensions’ or fundamental extents. In the first part of this essay, horizontal 
and vertical dimensions are examined and clarified. Later in the essay a third, 
‘lateral’, dimension is explored. Taken together these three dimensions make 
it possible to make sense of a concept found everywhere in Bergson’s thought, 
but has seldom been thought through in its basic structure: the concept of 
materialization. It will be possible both to spell out the different modes of 
materialization and to distinguish them into three kinds. 
The third point is perhaps surprising. Bergson’s notions of hierarchies of 
durations and of durational materialization led him to two significant discoveries 
(perhaps one should say premonitions): the concept of a dynamic (big bang) 
cosmology, and a notion of extensity which prefigures current ideas of fractal 
dimension. 
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It is often argued that ‘philosophy bakes no bread’. Bergson provides a 
counterexample. His philosophical method made it possible for him to suggest 
genuinely new and applicable ideas. 
1. Duration Versus Space
The most basic idea of Bergson’s philosophy – duration – is summed up in 
Time and Free Will (1890):
What is duration within us? A qualitative multiplicity with no likeness to 
number; an organic evolution which is not yet an increasing quantity1.
Out there in the world things are very different:
What duration is there existing outside us? The present only, or, if we prefer the 
expression, simultaneity2. 
The inner self, dynamic and unbroken, is a continuous flow. It grounds our 
spontaneity, forms the basis for our creative acts. The outer world, in dramatic 
contrast, is frozen. Made up of timeless instants, it does not flow. It is static. 
Bergson’s inner duration is the cornerstone of his concept of freedom. 
[…] the process of our free activity goes on, as it were, unknown to ourselves, 
in the obscure depths of our consciousness at every moment of duration, that the very 
feeling of duration comes from this source, and that without this heterogenous and 
continuous duration, in which our self evolves, there would be no moral crisis3. 
He adds that the free act arises only in such crises, which are rare4. 
Bergson’s thought may be understood as an attempt to explore the fundamental 
features of duration. He defends it against efforts to spatialize, fragment, or 
otherwise ‘freeze’ it. He persists in deepening and more adequately exploring its 
structure. 
Many have applauded Bergson’s descriptions of freedom and of the stream 
of consciousness. But in his first book, these are accompanied by significant 
problems. How is it possible for our inner freedom to affect the extended body 
given that it (i.e. freedom) is outside of space5 and that space and its contents 
are static? How can the dynamic inner self, on this theory, relate to the static 
outer world at all? How, for example, can we perceive it?
1 H. Bergson, Time and Free Will, translated by F. L. Pogson, London 1950, p. 226. All future 
reference to this work will be cited as TFW. 
2 TFW 227.
3 TFW 237-238n.
4 TFW 167, 231, 240.
5 TFW 21.
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Those familiar with the history of philosophy will recognize Bergson’s 
problem here as closely analogous to that of René Descartes. Descartes argued 
that mind and body are two substances whose essences are radically distinct. The 
mind’s essence is to think; the body’s essence is to be extended. Unfortunately, 
Descartes could find no fundamental character or essence to connect them. 
Bergson, similarly, holds that the self is a process and the world is a static 
geometrical array. For him, as for Descartes, the self and the world are entirely 
incompatible. The difference between the two is that the ‘mind-world’ (not 
merely ‘mind-body’) problem is now stated by Bergson in temporal terminology, 
and not in terms of the metaphysical concept of substance, as with Descartes. 
But the difficulty remains. How can the two sides of his new dualism, process 
and static geometry, ever be brought into some understandable relation?
An equally significant problem, but less evident, involves the structure of 
duration. Duration is described in Time and Free Will as dynamic, continuous, 
and qualitative, in contrast to the static character of mathematical space. Yet no 
account is given of the characteristics of different moments of duration in their 
relation to each other, however complex these relations may be. This is not only 
because in his first work he has focused only on the present, not on the past 
or future. He also has not analyzed the relations of the successive moments of 
duration to each other, or the way in which contemporary durations overlap.
2. Contrasting the Breadths of Duration: Horizontal and Vertical
In Matter and Memory (1896) Bergson’s earlier, largely amorphous stream 
of consciousness is transformed. More precisely, it is shown to have form6. The 
first such form can be termed horizontal. It involves the conjunction of present 
moments with their predecessors and their successors. The second is vertical.
We are not, Bergson now insists, isolated in the present. We are accompanied 
by the whole of our past: by what he calls «pure memory»7. Though we 
ordinarily disregard it, this accumulated reminiscence follows us through our 
daily lives. The concept of the integral survival of personal memory was picked 
up by Bergson’s cousin, Marcel Proust, and forms the basis for his vast novel À la 
Recherche du Temps Perdu8. Reading Proust provides a vivid sense of the sheer 
massiveness of personal memory.
To think of duration not as an isolated ‘now’ but as a process including the 
past is to think of duration as having breadth. The idea of duration as exhibiting 
longer and briefer rhythms is fundamental to the argument of Matter and 
6 H. Bergson, Matter and Memory, translated by N. Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer, Lon-
don-New York 1929, p. 194. All further references to this work will be cited as MM.
7 MM 167.
8 Pete A. Y. Gunter, Bergson and Proust: A Question of Influence, in Understanding Bergson, 
Understanding Modernism, edited by P. Ardoin, S. E. Gontarski, L. Mattison, New York 2013, 
pp. 157-176.
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Memory, in which there are many durations of many breadths. In his first book, 
Bergson writes as if all durations march to the same clock; in Matter and Memory 
there are many contrasting clocks. When these are arranged serially, one after the 
other, they can be said to have a horizontal dimension. When they are arranged 
so as to overlap each other, the longer presiding over the briefer, their dimension 
can be said to be vertical9.  
Bergson’s stream of consciousness is described by him in Time and Free 
Will as essentially continuous. Even there, however, the creativity which he 
describes in the free act involves a break, hence a discontinuity, with the past. (It 
is genuinely novel: hence the break.) In his second work, he describes duration 
as being given in ‘rhythms’ or ‘tensions’ which are of varying breadths and are 
distinguishable. This does not mean that they are to be distinguished as are 
points or regions in space. It does mean that they are not simply continuous and 
that we can readily tell one and its characteristics from another.  
To deal with this matter in depth would require an extended parenthesis10. 
It is enough to point out here that the horizontal structure or dimension of 
duration for Bergson consists of varying breadths which are distinguishable, 
hence not simply continuous. 
The vertical ‘dimension’ of duration is different. Here, as noted above, 
prolonged durations overlap the briefer, these overlap the briefer still, and 
these the still briefer. We are, for Bergson, more or less immanent in the world, 
depending on the level of duration at which we exist. When relaxed, we descend 
to briefer levels of duration. When more focused and self-possessed, we ascend 
to higher levels of duration. He states: 
There are, in short, different tones of mental life, or, in other words, our psychic 
life may be lived at different heights, now nearer to action, now further removed from 
it, according to our degree of attention to life11. 
Bergson terms these contrasting levels «tensions»12 or «tensions of 
duration»13. 
Ordinary language has an interesting way of expressing these distinctions. 
At lower levels of duration we may describe ourselves as ‘spaced out’ or just ‘not 
together’. One way of characterizing being together is to say we are ‘wound up’; 
its opposite would be to be ‘strung out’14.
9 This is the author’s terminology, not Bergson’s. 
10 It would be necessary, for example, to compare Bergson’s duration with the temporal notions 
of both William James and Alfred North Whitehead. 
11 MM xiv.
12 MM 221, 222, 227, 238, 257.
13 MM 275, 279.
14 One of the interesting things about these levels of duration is the slowing down of duration 
at lower levels as a multitude of briefer durations succeed each other in one experience. Con-
versely, at higher levels, far longer durations are felt as passing more quickly. Cf. Randall E. 
Auxier, In Vino Veritas, «Southwestern Philosophy Review», XXX, 2014, 1, pp. 39-66. Profes-
sor Auxier explores alcohol’s effect on the slowing-down of experience. 
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In stressing the vertical dimension of duration, it is necessary to add two 
more fundamental factors. These are (1) the approach that the briefer durations 
make to geometrical space and (2) their increasing plurality. That is, the phrase 
‘spaced out’ would usually evoke a state of exhaustion. Equally, in such moments 
we are much less ‘together’, much more dispersed, than we would like to be. 
These two distinctions (‘detension’ towards space and increasing pluralization, 
or fragmentation) will be developed later in this essay15. However, it will help to 
deal first with the integral, Proustian memory mentioned above. 
There are, Bergson holds, two contrasting sorts of memory. The first, 
spontaneous memory, occurs continually, with no particular effort, registering 
the moments of our lives in great detail. It is not, he argues, contained in the 
brain. Habit memory, by contrast, is embodied in our brain and nervous system. 
An example of habit memory would be the learning of the multiplication table 
or the spelling of a word; it is established by repetition and requires effort. 
The integral or Proustian memory mentioned above is synonymous with 
Bergson’s spontaneous memory. This notion has been adopted by contemporary 
psychology, which now terms it ‘episodic’ (sometimes ‘contextual’) memory. The 
appropriation of this Bergsonian concept and its opposite, habit memory, proved 
fundamental to the creation and development of today’s memory science16. 
3. Materialization
So far we have noted spontaneous or epochal memory to help make sense 
of the basic structures of duration. Here it will be necessary to add the concept 
of materialization. The example used here will be that of the materialization of 
memory images in perception. 
Ordinarily we think that when we want to remember something we ‘reach 
back’ to recover a recollection. The opposite is true for Bergson. Rather, we 
assume the right attitude and the sought-for memory comes to us. 
The truth is that memory does not consist in a regression from the present to 
the past, but, on the contrary, in a progression from the past that we place ourselves at 
a stroke. We start from a ‘virtual state’ which we lead onwards, step by step, through 
a series of difference planes of consciousness, to the goal where it is materialized in an 
actual perception17. 
The mass of episodic memories which we carry with us are not ornaments. 
If memories survive,
15 These two factors in memory will be discussed later, along with the third (lateral or trans-
verse) factor of duration in the section dealing with Bergson’s theory of the creation of matter. 
16 Pete A. Y. Gunter, A Tale of Two Memories: Bergson and the Rise of Memory Science, «Mind 
and Matter», XI, 2013, 1, pp. 1-16. 
17 MM 319.
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it is with a view to utility at every moment they complete our present experience, 
enriching it with experience already acquired18. 
To take an ordinary example: personal, episodic memory reminds me 
of a cup of coffee and of how to grasp it. The confluence of recognition and 
behavioral familiarity creates my ability to know and grasp the cup. Without 
personal memory, we could not recognize the world around us19. 
The fundamental thrust is: memory, rich with the accumulation of prior 
experience, flows into our present moment. Memory is a fundamental ingredient 
in the stream of consciousness. But memory can aid us in dealing with our 
physical environment, though it can also transcend this use. Memory, Bergson 
teaches, is fundamental to the free act: 
Not only, by its memory of former experience, does this consciousness retain 
the past better and better, so as to organize it with the present in a newer and richer 
decision; but, living with an intenser life, contracting, by the memory of the immediate 
experience in its present duration, it becomes more capable of creating acts of which 
the inner determination… will pass more easily through the meshes of necessity20. 
 
The nature of Bergsonian duration is to materialize out of the past into the 
present, remaking it. The past, rather than limiting us, is a condition of new and 
broader possibilities. 
I want to apologize in advance for the following caricature. It is as if 
recognition consisted of a right triangle whose vertical axis represents the 
various levels of duration and whose horizontal axis represents the horizontal 
movement of time. The hypotenuse in this cartoon would be a downward 
escalator carrying images which, as they approach the ground floor, take on 
specific, ever more definitive shapes, finally arriving definite and pictorial: they 
are, thus, materialized. 
The point of such a representation is, however, to make it clear that 
Bergson is dealing with specific, if dynamic and qualitative, structures. The 
process of materialization, which appears everywhere in his philosophy from 
Matter and Memory on, is not a fantasy. It is an understandable process resulting 
in definite materialized structures. But since none of these structures can step 
out of duration and become geometry, they will have durational characters of 
their own. This is particularly important when it comes to Bergson’s philosophy 
of biology, which is rooted in the notion of biological time, which is itself a 
product of an evolutionary creativity. 
18 MM 70.
19 The major difference between Proust and Bergson is that for Bergson the past is vectored 
towards the future and coping behavior. For Proust the past is viable, simply, as such. 
20 MM 332.
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4. From Psychological Duration to Physical Duration
So far we have dealt, however briefly, with the horizontal and vertical 
structures of duration. Here we will deal again with vertical dimension: now not 
for its own sake, but in order to understand its lowest level: material duration, 
or matter. We recall that the vertical aspects of matter involve the way in which 
durations of different lengths ‘stack’, the longer extending over the briefer. It is 
more helpful in this respect to think not of stacking (a heavily spatial image), 
but of an extended melody enduring over briefer melodic forms, and these over 
briefer rhythms still. It is this many-level musical Gestalt which Bergson finds to 
be the precondition not only of creative acts, but of our perception of the ‘outer’ 
world.
In An Introduction to Metaphysics (1903) Bergson describes the vertical 
character of duration and its end-point: the extraordinarily brief durations 
(frequencies) of matter. Our awareness of our own duration, he states: 
brings us into contact with a whole continuity of durations which we must 
try to follow, whether downwards or upwards; in both cases we can extend ourselves 
indefinitely by an increasingly violent effort, in both cases we transcend ourselves. In 
the first we advance towards a more and more attenuated duration, the pulsations of 
which, being rapider than ours and dividing our simple sensation, dilute its quality 
into quantity; at the limit would be pure repetition, that pure repetition by which we 
define materiality21.
This passage was written at a time when Newtonian physics was at its 
height. But if what Bergson is saying is true, we are going to have to change 
some fundamental physical notions. Matter here becomes a series of successive 
durations, of ‘rhythms’. It is no longer an aggregate of hard, inert particles, the 
same at each instant. Rather, Bergson argues that matter is an «ever-renewed 
present»22 comprised of «…modifications, perturbations, changes of tensions of 
energy, and nothing else»23. No matter how brief its pulsations, the temporality 
of matter is never instantaneous. 
Any number of issues arise in relation to Bergson’s temporalist theory of 
matter. That it resembles quantum physics in central respects has been widely 
noted and discussed. To discuss it here would be to write not an article but a long 
monograph. Instead I will cite physicist Louis de Broglie’s essay on Bergson’s 
theory of matter as a good introduction to this fascinating subject24. Closely 
allied to this issue is the question of how Bergson’s theory of matter relates to 
21 H. Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, translated by T. E. Hulme, edited by J. Mullar-
key and M. Kolkman, Houndmills 2007, p. 37. All future references to this work will be cited 
as IM.
22 MM 178.
23 MM 266.
24 See L. de Broglie, The Concepts of Contemporary Physics and Bergson’s Ideas on Time and 
Motion, in Bergson and the Evolution of Physics, edited and translated by Pete. A. Y. Gunter, 
Knoxville 1969.
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physical cosmology. This question will be dealt with below, in conjunction with 
an examination of his notion of the creation (that is, materialization) of matter. 
Equally interesting is the question of how Bergson’s qualitative durations relate 
to mathematics, i.e. to mathematical descriptions of nature. 
It is surprising, considering his insistence on the qualitative character of 
duration, that Bergson is able to find quantitative relations between the duration 
of consciousness and that of matter. The briefest possible human perception, 
he notes, citing Exner, is 1/500 of a second. In this brief moment, red light 
accomplishes 400 billion vibrations25. As is true for Bergson in all cases of 
perception of the world around us, human awareness extends over the durations 
of matter, bringing the sets of durations of very different extents into direct 
contact. 
It is thus true both that duration is qualitative, dynamic, and 
interpenetrating, yet can sustain mathematical relationships. His ‘take’ on quality 
and quantity is similar to that of Leibniz, whose monads – the fundamental 
reality of his universe – sustain mathematical relationships, including natural 
laws. The monads themselves are fundamentally qualitative. Bergson’s «durée» 
thus must be understood as having both qualitative and quantitative aspects.  
5. A Summing Up: Expression and Materialization
This essay so far has attempted to explore factors as remote from each 
other as personal memory and the duration of matter, temporal hierarchy and 
human freedom. These investigations have a central point: to make clear not only 
that duration has structure, but that this structure sustains and makes possible 
creative or productive acts. I will call the initiation of such acts expression, and 
their completion (their embodiment) materialization. 
In any case of expression-materialization, four factors must be satisfied. 
That is, each instance of materialization proceeds (1) from a relative past into a 
present moment; (2) from a longer duration through briefer to briefest durations; 
(3) from lesser to greater extensity; and (4) from greater unity and simplicity to 
greater plurality or dispersion. 
Not all cases of materialization are creative, or, for that matter, successful. 
Bergson describes three types or modes of materialization. These are: 
1) Those involving successful embodiment (the free act, artistic or scientific 
creativity, biological speciation…);
2) Those whose results do not add to their initial insight (ex. the recall of 
memories) but merely materialize it in detail; and 
3) Those which express diminished creativity (failed conceptual creativity; in 
psychology, neurosis, the amnesias…).
25 MM 46.
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The third of these is seen in Bergson’s account of the creation and entropic 
descent of matter, to which we now turn. 
To repeat myself: these structures are found everywhere in Bergson’s 
writings, from Matter and Memory on. Also, like Kantian categories or 
Whitehead’s categorical scheme, they help us to understand the coherence of 
Bergson’s thought. 
6. Philosophical Insight and Scientific Discovery
If at first glance there would seem to be little in common between a human 
stream of consciousness and the nature of physical matter, the comparison 
Bergson makes between that stream (soon, as we will see, to be transformed 
into a waterfall) and the birth and development of the physical universe must 
seem strange indeed. But that is exactly what Bergson does. Using the notions of 
temporal structure and materialization that we have just examined, he proposes 
a physical cosmology which is a cosmogony: an account of the creation and 
expansion of the universe. A universe which expands from an initial moment is 
defined as a ‘big bang’ cosmology. 
Bergson’s notion of materialization is fundamental to his theory of the 
genesis of matter. As we have seen, human activity proceeds out of a past into 
a present, from a unified ‘higher’ duration into a plurality of ‘lower’ durations. 
In attentive perception, recollections are actualized as images which help us 
to cope with our surroundings. As we will see, he also applies the notion of 
materialization to natural processes. This includes cosmology, as we have just 
said. But it also includes biological evolution. We find this notion at the center 
of Creative Evolution (1907). 
An unapologetic, full-blown metaphysics, Creative Evolution presents the 
striking vision of a universe in constant motion, perpetually transforming itself. 
At the center of his vision is the phenomenon of life: biological evolution. 
Evolution for Bergson is not the simple accumulation of accidental 
variations, but is a creative process. If it is not the product of accidental 
variations, however, neither is it the point-by-point filling-in of a plan. Rather, 
it is the product of a «vital impetus»26 which embodies itself, diverging to 
create innumerable life forms. Bergson treats speciation as a materialization of 
the original impetus. Each species expresses one aspect of that ‘push’, but in a 
limited way. 
The evolution of life and the descent of materiality are portrayed in Creative 
Evolution as opposites: 
26 H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, translated by A. Mitchell, edited by K. A. Pearson, M. Kolk-
man, M. Vaughon, Houndmills 2007, pp. 153, 167. All future references to this work will be 
cited as CE. 
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life is a movement, materiality is the inverse movement, and each of these two 
movements is simple…27.
As life proceeds towards the creation of new life forms with higher degrees 
of temporality, matter embodies increasing dispersion, increasing production of 
entropy, and a strong tendency towards loss of form. 
Initially, Bergson points out, matter was endowed with very high energy 
states, which have constantly eroded. The second law of thermodynamics, which 
describes the degradation of these states, cannot explain their initial condition. 
Where did this initial (to use E. Schrödinger’s term) «negentropy» come from? 
Bergson concludes that it is the result of an initial creation, from which the 
universe begins28. 
This view of things contrasts dramatically with previous cosmologies. 
Prior to and well into the twentieth century, it was widely assumed that the 
world in its basic structure is fundamentally stable: its basic structures do not 
change. It was this opinion to which Einstein deferred when he introduced his 
famous cosmological constant into relativistic cosmology. This constant (which 
Einstein insisted was the only mistake he ever made29) guaranteed that the 
universe can never expand and that it had no origin. It is striking that in 1907 
Bergson proposed that the universe does expand and has an origin at a single 
moment. Given the then almost universal belief in a stable universe, it was a 
daring speculation. 
The first scientific expanding universe theory was introduced by Georges 
Lemaître in 1927. His view was later supported by Harlow Shapley’s discovery 
of redshifts in distant galaxies. (If, as these testify, galaxies are all moving away 
from us, the cosmos in which they exist must be expanding.) In 1931 Lemaître 
extended his theory to include the hypothesis of a «primordial atom», a single 
material point from which the universe springs30. 
Subsequent investigations have led beyond Lemaître’s theory to general 
acceptance of the «inflationary» cosmology championed by Alan Guth31. On 
this model the major features of the physical world emerge in an initial period of 
rapid cosmic expansion. In this cosmology no primeval atom explodes to create 
the first moments of the universe. Instead there is at the beginning a ‘singularity’ 
– a mere ‘this’ about which nothing more can be said. From this inexplicable ‘x’, 
all reality is said to emerge. 
27 CE 160.
28 CE 134, 159.
29 Cf. H. C. Ohanian, Einstein’s Mistakes: The Human Failings of Genius, New York 2008, p. 
394. 
30 G. Lemaître, The Primeval Atom: An Essay in Cosmology, New York 1950, p. 186. It would 
be interesting to know whether Lemaître had come across Creative Evolution. So far as I know, 
no scholarship has been done on this question. 
31 A. Guth, The Inflationary Universe: The Quest for a New Theory of Cosmic Origins, Cam-
bridge MA 1998, p. 358. 
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Bergson’s cosmological speculations were not based on his philosophical 
and psychological ideas alone. Recently astronomers had shown that galaxies are 
still being formed32 – a fact which strongly suggested to him that the universe 
is not complete but is still being formed. More fundamentally, as just noted, he 
depended on thermodynamics.
Bergson’s notions of the creation of matter and its subsequent expansion 
are interesting both for their tracking of subsequent science and in themselves 
as examples of speculative philosophy. But they also provide fundamental 
insights into both of Bergson’s concepts of duration and materialization. We have 
explored so far two fundamental ‘structures’ of duration, terming them horizontal 
and vertical dimensions. A third has been mentioned: duration’s ‘transverse’ or 
‘lateral’ dimension. This structure or fundamental characteristic consists of a set 
of simultaneous or, better, contemporary events. Using again a musical analogy: 
when a group of drummers in a marching band manage to get in synch, we have 
many rhythms occurring at the same time and at the same beat (tempo). So with 
the many rhythms of matter: when they pulsate together (have roughly the same 
frequency; for example, two electrons) they are contemporaneous, constituting a 
shared dynamic structure. This structure, found pervasively in the natural world, 
can be termed a dimension. 
To introduce the notion of multiple shared rhythms is to begin to make 
clearer not only Bergson’s concept of duration, but also his notion of materialization 
as well. In discussing materialization, not enough attention has been paid to the 
increasing diversity or plurality that occurs at each step. Expression, consistently 
for the French intuitionist, begins with unity and proceeds through stages of 
increasing plurality. His treatment of the creation of matter makes clear this 
systematically growing multiplicity. As we have seen, he traces physical materiality 
back to a single point. But he then follows it towards its embodiment in the 
almost unthinkable plurality of physical ‘particles’ that constitute our universe. 
Expression-materialization, however different it may be in different cases, always, 
besides proceeding from higher to lower durations, with a concomitant increase in 
the number of briefer durations, moves towards a greater plurality of contemporary 
parts: towards greater simultaneous multiplicity. 
Here Bergson’s concept of the materialization of matter meets the concept 
of matter worked out in Matter and Memory. That is, the matter deriving from an 
initial ‘creation’, according to the nature of materialization, would be so many very 
brief pulses or rhythms of duration. But this is the view he had developed earlier, 
that of matter as an ever-renewed present consisting of changes of tension or energy. 
Materialization, a temporal process, always produces temporal structures33. 
32 CE 159.
33 This realization helps add content to Bergson’s vital impetus, which would be interpreted as 
producing organisms understandable through their temporal structures. This would be a chro-
nobiology stressing the vertical structure of duration: biological times overarching biological 
times. 
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7. Bergsonian Extensity and Fractal Space
Throughout this essay, Bergson’s notion of partial extension has been 
cited, usually along with the kindred notion of temporal hierarchy. This is not 
an easy concept to ‘get’. It would appear that the pen with which these words 
are written is either three-dimensional or it is not a pen. The notion that it is 
not quite three-dimensional seems at best peculiar – one of those ideas best left 
to the philosophers.
But this counterintuitive notion of space has been saved from philosophical 
oblivion by mathematicians, most notably by Benoit B. Mandelbrot, the founder 
of fractal geometry34. Mandelbrot’s mathematics is fascinating both in itself and 
for its applications. It is also useful in helping us understand Bergson’s notion of 
a lived, incremental space. 
For standard geometry dimensions, height, width, and depth are understood 
to be whole numbers or integers. They are presumed to be homogenous (have 
the same character in all directions) and continuous (smooth). None of these 
assumptions hold for fractal geometry. Most strikingly, in this geometry there 
can be fractional dimensions. These would be dimensions having 1/2, 2/3, 3/4, 
7/18 extent. The character of these dimensions changes throughout their range 
and instead of being ‘smooth’ they are ‘rough’. Graphs of fractals are typically 
as uneven as a fever chart; those of standard unitary dimensions are, whether 
curves or straight lines, smooth. 
The parallels between Bergsonian qualitative extensity and fractal geometry 
are striking. Just as a fractal dimension can be asymptotically closer and closer 
to a unitary dimension (as 0.9999 approximates 1.0), so Bergsonian extensity, 
as we have seen, approximates standard mathematical space without reaching it. 
The spatiality which he finds to be ingredient in all our experience approaches 
mathematical space only as a limit. This is true of matter at the cosmological 
scale. If he often uses phrases like «detends into space»35 it is clear that Bergson 
does not presuppose there is a space into which matter disperses. In Time and 
Free Will he describes such a space as, in Kant’s sense, a form of perception, a way 
of perceiving and ordering the world36. In Creative Evolution he defines space as 
a mere “schema” towards which matter detends37. 
But there is more. In Creative Evolution Bergson adds to his notion of a 
created, expanding universe an additional speculation. That is, he argues that 
materiality gains in complexity as it disperses. Typically, he uses a philosophical/
psychological model to describe this process. If, as we listen to a poet read his 
poem, our focus of attention relaxes,
34 B. B. Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature, New York 1983, p. 468. 
35 CE 130, 135, 152. Bergson often uses the term «detension» in describing physical matter’s 
descent into space, never the term «extension». The meaning of détendre in French is helpful. 
To detend is to relax, stretch out, loosen, unbend. See Bantam New College French and English 
Dictionary, New York 1986, p. 27.
36 TFW 97, 236.
37 CE 130.
© Lo Sguardo - rivista di filosofia
N. 26, 2018 (I) - Bergson dal vivo
243
  the successive sounds will become more individualized; as the phrases are bro-
ken down into words, so the words will scan into syllables which I perceive one after 
another38. 
If we were to go farther in the direction, continuing to lose focus, our 
awareness heads towards a dreamlike state. At the limit, the words will become 
letters and lose their solidity39. 
There is, he believes, a basic simplicity to the poem. But as we lose track 
of this simplicity we encounter greater and greater complexity. The further this 
detension into space is prolonged, the more complexity is created40. For Bergson 
this amounts to a kind of law. To the degree that materiality «detends», its degree 
of complexity increases, and vice versa. Hence a Bergsonian temporal dimension 
creates a growing order in a growing complexity. A fractal dimension is defined 
as measuring complexity or a «a ratio of change in detail to change of scale»41. 
But – and surprisingly to this writer – this notion of a fractal dimension as an 
‘index of complexity’ precisely parallels the French philosopher’s notions of the 
relations between increasing extensity and increasing complexity. 
In the prior section of this article it was argued that Bergson, in 1907, 
proposed a big bang cosmology. This is true, but needs qualification. His 
universe, unlike the present inflationary cosmology, does not presuppose a 
classic 3-D space of unitary dimensions, but, as we have seen, an incremental 
space closely analogous to fractal dimensions. This too could be set aside as still 
another philosopher’s folly. But while inflationary theory continues to be the most 
widely accepted cosmology, it is interesting to note that big bang cosmologies 
using fractals are now being proposed by some contemporary scientists42. 
 
8. Some Concluding Reflections
An article like this, which covers may and diverse subject-matters, is by 
its very nature unable to explore any one of them in depth. The author must 
then apologize for the relatively superficial treatment of any number of fields 
38 CE 134.
39 Bergson is saying that as we lose focus of attention, our attention span moves down the 
temporal ladder, becoming briefer at each level. Hence, we are aware of briefer and briefer 
segments of the poem: down to the letters. 
40 CE 135.
41 G. P. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, Washington D.C. 1997, pp. 237-243, 291-299. For a 
remarkably clear exposition of the concept of fractal dimension (in the concept of strange at-
tractors and nonintegrable dimensions), cf. S. H. Kellert, In the Wake of Chaos, Chicago 1993, 
pp. 15-19. 
42 G. Calgani, Quantum Field Theory, Gravity, and Cosmology in a Fractal Universe, «Journal of 
High Energy Physics», March 2010, pp. 1-37; M. Reuter and F. Saueressig, Asymptotic Safety, 
Fractals, and Cosmology, in Quantum Gravity and Quantum Cosmology, edited by G. Calcagni, 
L. Papantonopoulos, G. Siopsis, N. Tsamis, Berlin 2013, pp. 185-226. Mandelbrot seems to 
have glimpsed this possibility early on. Cf. his foreword to Y. Barysher and P. Teerikorpi, Dis-
covery of Cosmic Fractals, New Jersey 2002, pp. xvii-xxiv. 
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(memory science, cosmology, fractals…) in the present essay. He writes only an 
essay, not a monograph. 
But what is true of the scientific aspects of this manuscript is true of 
its philosophical side as well. Three dimensions or fundamental structures 
of duration have been spelled out here. But it needs to be stressed that none 
of them exists in isolation. Each is internally related to the others so that the 
character of one at any time is influenced by the others. Equally, the way in 
which psychological time is influenced by and (I believe, affects) the many and 
interrelated rhythms of the brain and body is nowhere dealt with. I can only 
promise to make an effort to deal with them in the future.
The author would like to make another, particularly general, point here. 
That is, if one finds conjoined structures of duration and of materialization 
everywhere in Bergson’s philosophy, their presence throughout testifies to an 
overarching coherence in his thought which is rarely understood. If he seems in 
his writings to be tackling subjects of exceptional diversity – from the nature of 
dreams, memory, and perception to the nature of space, matter, and cosmology 
– the same dynamic structures are found throughout. In the manner of A. N. 
Whitehead’s categorical scheme,43 they hold his thought together and embody 
the same basic insights. This weighs strongly against attempts to view him as an 
anti-intellectual or, more bizarrely, an irrationalist philosopher44. 
 Finally, I hope the part that memory plays in all instances of materialization 
has been made clear. If it has not, this is the place to insist on it. Recognition of 
perceptual objects, moral acts, biological evolution, the creation/dispersion of 
matter: all the examples one might give of materialization involve the carry-over 
of the past into the present that Bergson calls memory45. This carry-over often 
merely recapitulates the richness of the past. But it can also involve a creativity 
which, presuming and requiring the past and memory, transcends them. 
In spite of these and other limitations, it seems to this writer that this 
essay does establish two things. The first concerns the status of Bergson’s 
thought. Is it antiscientific? The answer may depend on how the question is 
meant. Unquestionably, Bergson is critical of the sciences. But his critiques of 
the science of his time were intended to lead to new and fruitful insights. The 
two cases examined in this article – big bang cosmology and quasi-fractal space 
– show that there were points where he was able to succeed. 
The second point concerns the status of philosophy per se. Is philosophy to be 
understood as the vain quest for an elusive certainty which never seems to appear? Or 
might it be conceived as a difficult and problematic effort to arrive at fresh conceptual 
insights, insights which can be fruitful – that is, useful in the broadest possible sense? 
If the latter option can be taken seriously, then Bergson’s thought provides a case in 
43 Cf. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, Corrected Edition, New York 1978, pp. 18-30. 
44 The reference here is particularly to B. Russell, The Philosophy of Bergson, London 1914, p. 
36. 
45 The exception would be the habit memory noted briefly above, which simply repeats pat-
terns engrained in the nervous system. 
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point. His way of doing philosophy, though hardly beyond criticism, has proved 
fruitful in any number of ways. He must have gotten something right. 
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